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Abstract 
Concerns about global climate change have substantially increased the likelihood that future 
policy will seek to minimize carbon dioxide emissions.  As such, even today, electric utilities are 
making resource planning and investment decisions that consider the possible implications of 
these future carbon regulations.  In this article, we examine the manner in which utilities assess 
the financial risks associated with future carbon regulations within their long-term resource 
plans.  We base our analysis on a review of the most recent resource plans filed by fifteen 
electric utilities in the Western United States.  Virtually all of these utilities made some effort to 
quantitatively evaluate the potential cost of future carbon regulations when analyzing alternate 
supply- and demand-side resource options for meeting customer load.  Even without Federal 
climate regulation in the U.S., the prospect of that regulation is already having an impact on 
utility decision-making and resource choices.  That said, the methods and assumptions used by 
utilities to analyze carbon regulatory risk, and the impact of that analysis on their choice of a 
particular resource strategy, vary considerably, revealing a number of opportunities for analytic 
improvement.  Though our review focuses on a subset of U.S. electric utilities, this work holds 
implications for all electric utilities and energy policymakers who are seeking to minimize the 
compliance costs associated with future carbon regulations.     
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1. Introduction 
Regulated electric utilities in many U.S. jurisdictions are required to prepare long-term resource 
plans to evaluate demand- and supply-side resource options for meeting customer load 
requirements over periods typically spanning ten to twenty years.1  Typically, this is done 
through an evaluation of various “candidate portfolios,” each consisting of a different mix of 
supply- and demand-side resources; based on that analysis, a “preferred portfolio” of generation 
and efficiency investments is proposed.   
 
Given the long development lead-time and economic lifetime of most electric infrastructure 
investments, utilities must evaluate the potential costs and risks of candidate portfolios over a 
lengthy time horizon.  One long-term and potentially far-reaching financial risk currently facing 
                                                 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1510 495 2593; fax: +1510 486 6996. E-mail addresses: glbarbose@lbl.gov (G. 
Barbose), rhwiser@lbl.gov (R. Wiser), aaphadke@lbl.gov (A. Phadke), and cagoldman@lbl.gov (C. Goldman). 
1 We use the term resource plan to include what are variously referred to as integrated resource plans, least-cost 
plans, long-term procurement plans, default electric supply plans, and the like.  
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the electricity industry is the uncertain cost of future carbon dioxide (CO2) regulations.2  
Notwithstanding the fact that Federal climate regulation does not yet exist in the U.S., many 
utilities are beginning to actively assess the potential cost of future carbon regulations within 
their resource plans, and are starting to evaluate options for limiting their exposure to these 
highly uncertain costs.  Issues of environmental regulatory risk are, in fact, not new to utility 
planning, and a variety of authors have discussed the need for utilities to consider such risks.3  
However, the risks posed by the possibility of future greenhouse gas regulations are of 
unprecedented scale and scope.  How utilities evaluate and manage these risks may have 
substantial implications for generation and demand-side resource choices.  Yet, with few 
exceptions, little effort has been made to assess how utilities (and their regulators) might best 
analyze and manage these risks through existing resource planning and investment processes. 
 
As a step in this direction, we examine the treatment of carbon regulatory risk in the most recent 
resource plans filed by fifteen electric utilities in the Western United States (see Table 1).4  
Together, these utilities account for approximately 60% of retail electricity sales in the West, and 
cover nine of eleven Western states.  Our comparative analysis has two related elements.   
 
First, we compare and assess utilities’ approaches to addressing key analytical issues that arise 
when considering the risk of future carbon regulations, including: 
 
• assumptions about the future design of carbon regulations and the cost of carbon emissions; 
• the degree to which low-carbon resources and candidate portfolios are evaluated; 
• the effects of carbon regulations on other aspects of the utility planning environment (e.g., 
effects on load growth, natural gas prices, and fossil plant retirements); and       
• the manner in which uncertainty in portfolio costs associated with future carbon regulations 
is considered in the process of selecting a preferred resource portfolio.5 
 
Second, we summarize the composition and carbon intensity of the preferred resource portfolios 
selected by the fifteen utilities in their resource plans.  This component of our analysis highlights 
general trends and differences in the strategic direction of Western utilities, and the implications 
of these decisions for their exposure to carbon regulatory risk.  
 
Though our review focuses on a subset of U.S. electric utilities, this work holds implications for 
all electric utilities and energy policymakers that are seeking to minimize the compliance costs 
                                                 
2 Though we only address financial risks related to future climate change regulations, utilities also face risks 
associated with the physical impacts of climate change, itself (e.g., the potential effects on electricity consumption, 
hydro-electric generation, and cooling water availability, among others). 
3 Other work that has explored the implications of environmental regulatory risk for utility policy, planning, and 
investment decisions includes: Andrews and Govil (1996), Bokenkamp et al. (2005), Cavanagh et al. (1993), 
Clemmer and Freese (2006), Gardiner and Associates (2006), Johnston et al. (2006), Repetto and Henderson (2003), 
and Wiser et al. (2004). 
4 This article draws from a lengthier study conducted by Berkeley Lab (Barbose et al. 2008).  Our review is limited 
to the resource plans filed by utilities.  This work builds off of previous efforts at Berkeley Lab to evaluate Western 
utility resource plans, including Bolinger and Wiser (2005), which examines the treatment of renewable energy; and 
Hopper, Goldman, and Schlegel (2006), which examines the treatment of energy efficiency.   
5 Another important methodological issue, which we do not address, is utilities’ assumptions about the cost and 
performance of different types of resources (low-carbon or otherwise); see Bolinger and Wiser (2005) for a 
comparison of utilities’ cost and performance assumptions for various renewable electricity sources. 
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associated with future carbon regulations.  Even in areas where carbon regulations already exist, 
the possibility of strengthened future policies must be considered in planning decisions.  As such, 
a major component of our effort is to develop a series of recommendations for how energy 
planners might better address and manage the risk of future carbon regulations.  
 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows.  We begin in Section 2 by characterizing 
the significance of carbon regulatory risk for electric resource economics.  In the following four 
sections, we compare utilities’ treatment of the four analytical issues itemized above, namely: 
their base-case and alternate assumptions about future carbon regulations and emission prices 
(Section 3); the extent to which they evaluated low-carbon candidate portfolios and the 
underlying type and quantity of low-carbon resources included in those portfolios (Section 4); 
the potential indirect impacts of carbon regulations that utilities considered in their portfolio 
analysis (Section 5); and the manner in which information about uncertainty in carbon emission 
costs informed utilities’ selection of specific preferred resource portfolios (Section 6).  In Section 
7, we describe the composition and carbon intensity of the preferred resource portfolios selected 
by the fifteen utilities.  Last, in Section 8, we offer several concluding remarks and 
recommendations for utilities and energy policymakers that are seeking to minimize the costs 
associated with future carbon regulations. 
 
2. The Importance of Carbon Regulatory Risk for Utility Resource Planning 
The emergence of carbon regulatory risk as a fundamental issue for utility resource planning 
stems, in part, from growing consensus within the industry that carbon regulations are likely to 
be enacted (or become more stringent) well within the lifetime of new resource investments.  In a 
recent poll of approximately 100 senior electricity industry executives in the U.S., for example, 
about half expected federal climate change legislation to be enacted by 2009, and more than 90% 
expected such legislation to be adopted by 2014 (GF Energy 2007).  These sentiments are, no 
doubt, fueled by the proactive efforts of other countries to limit carbon emissions, as well as by 
the array of legislative proposals introduced in the U.S. Congress over the past several years and 
by the fact that, in the absence of federal legislation, many states have begun taking action on 
their own to limit greenhouse gas emissions.6   
 
In addition to perceptions of increasing likelihood, carbon regulations represent a significant 
regulatory risk because of the potentially dramatic impact they could have on electric resource 
costs.  To illustrate the potential impact of a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system on the relative 
cost of different electric resource options, Figure 1 translates carbon emission prices into 
incremental operating costs for various resource options.  Overlaid on top of these cost curves 
are projections from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) of the CO2 emission 
allowance prices (EIA 2003, 2007a, and 2007b) that could occur under a range of U.S. federal 
legislative proposals: the McCain-Lieberman Climate Stewardship Act of 2003 (S.139), draft 
legislation prepared by Senator Bingaman in late 2006, and the McCain-Lieberman Climate 
Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2007 (S.280).   
 
                                                 
6 For recent summaries of existing state and regional carbon policies throughout the U.S., see Lutsey and Sperling 
(2008) and Pew Center (2007). 
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All three of these proposals would establish economy-wide cap-and-trade systems for U.S. 
greenhouse gas emissions, but they differ significantly in terms of the size and timing of the 
emission cuts and other key provisions.  EIA’s projection of CO2 emission prices for the 2006 
Bingaman proposal corresponds to a levelized emission price of approximately $6/short ton7 over 
the period 2010-2030, adding about $6/MWh to the operating cost of coal-fired power generation 
without carbon capture and storage (CCS) and about $3/MWh to the cost of natural gas-fired 
combined cycle gas turbine generation (CCGT).  At the other end of the spectrum, EIA’s 
projection of emission prices under S.139 corresponds to a levelized price of approximately 
$44/short ton, which would add about $41/MWh to the operating cost of coal-fired generation 
without CCS, and about $18/MWh to the cost of a CCGT.  Such a price increase could 
fundamentally alter the relative economics of different electric resource options. 
 
3. Carbon Regulations and Emission Prices Modeled in Utility Resource Plans 
The starting point in quantitatively evaluating carbon regulatory risk is to develop specific 
assumptions about the carbon regulations that could plausibly be implemented over the lifetime 
of the resource investments being considered.  Given the high degree of uncertainty in the nature 
and timing of future carbon regulations, utilities often develop a range of alternate assumptions 
to evaluate through scenario analyses.  In this section, we describe the carbon regulations that 
utilities in our sample posited when estimating the cost of alternate candidate portfolios, with 
particular attention to their projections of potential carbon emission prices under a carbon tax or 
cap-and-trade system.   
  
3.1 Utility projections of carbon emission prices  
With only one exception, all of the utilities in our review – in many cases following a regulatory 
mandate8 – incorporated the possibility of future carbon regulations into their analysis of 
different resource options, either as part of their base-case analysis scenario, in alternate 
scenarios, or both.9  In California and Oregon, the state’s electricity regulators (public utility 
commissions, or PUCs) specified the carbon emission prices that investor-owned utilities were 
required to incorporate in their resource planning analyses.10  Where state PUCs have not 
                                                 
7 1 short ton = 0.907 metric tons 
8 Resource planning rules in California, Oregon, Montana, and Washington require investor-owned utilities to 
include carbon emission costs in their resource planning analysis and/or to evaluate risks associated with future 
carbon emission regulations.  Resource planning rules in Nevada and Utah require utilities to consider 
environmental externalities, which can function as a proxy for regulatory compliance costs, but do not specifically 
mention carbon emission externalities or carbon regulatory costs. 
9 Utilities generally specified few details about the carbon tax or cap-and-trade modeled in their resource plan other 
than a projection of carbon emission prices, and in some cases referred to the two types of policies interchangeably.  
From the perspective of evaluating future resource investments, carbon taxes and cap-and-trade systems are 
functionally similar, in that both establish a standardized price per unit of emissions, although prices may be less 
volatile under a carbon tax (Parry and Pizer 2007).  Other important differences exist between the two policies, as 
well as among cap-and-trade programs (e.g., allowance allocation); however, most of these differences relate 
primarily to distribution effects and are therefore largely immaterial from the specific perspective of a utility 
evaluating future resource investments.  One design issue that is relevant to utility resource investment decisions, 
though, is whether utilities are freely allocated allowances for new fossil-fuel fired power plants. 
10 The California PUC requires the state’s utilities to use an emission price of $8 per ton of CO2 (nominal) starting in 
2004, escalating at 5% per year.  The Oregon PUC requires the state’s utilities to conduct scenario analyses with 
carbon prices of $0, $10, $25, and $40 per ton (1990$) but does not specify the timing of those prices. 
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provided specific guidance or requirements regarding carbon price assumptions, utilities have 
often relied on analyses of recent federal legislative proposals.  For example, six utilities 
assumed carbon emission prices equal to the safety-valve price initially recommended by the 
National Commission on Energy Policy (NCEP 2004).   
 
In Figure 2, we compare utilities’ base-case and alternative CO2 price projections in terms of the 
levelized price over the period 2010-2030.  These levelized prices capture differences in the 
overall magnitude of utilities’ price projections, as well as differences in their assumptions about 
when carbon regulations would come into effect.  We benchmark these assumptions against 
EIA’s projections of carbon emission allowance prices under the three federal policy proposals 
identified previously: the original 2003 McCain-Lieberman bill (S.139), draft legislation 
prepared by Senator Bingaman in late-2006, and the 2007 McCain-Lieberman bill (S.280).  To 
capture a wider set of potential policies and modeling methods and assumptions, we also show 
the low-, mid-, and high-range CO2 price projections developed by Synapse Energy Economics 
(Johnston et al, 2006).  Synapse developed these projections, in part, by synthesizing the results 
of eleven modeling studies of five separate federal policy proposals (all issued prior to 2006). 
 
Eleven of the fifteen utilities in our sample included carbon regulatory costs in their base-case 
portfolio analysis, with levelized carbon emission price projections ranging from $4 to $20 per 
short ton of CO2 (2007$).  As shown in Figure 2, many of these utilities’ base-case carbon price 
assumptions are near the low end relative to the benchmarks provided in the figure.  It would 
therefore appear that many utilities, especially those with no carbon regulation in their base-case 
analysis, may be underestimating the “most likely” cost of carbon emissions.11 
 
Given the inherently speculative nature of projecting future policy outcomes, it is particularly 
important for resource planners to model candidate portfolio costs under a broad range of 
potential carbon emission prices.  Eleven of the utilities in our review conducted scenario 
analyses to evaluate portfolio costs under alternate carbon price projections to their base-case 
(including three of the four utilities that assumed no carbon regulations in their base-case).  Most 
of these utilities evaluated scenarios with levelized carbon prices of $30/ton or greater, consistent 
with a relatively aggressive carbon policy.  However, several utilities (Avista, Nevada Power, 
and Sierra Pacific) examined a more-limited range of carbon price scenarios, and four utilities 
(LADWP, PG&E, SCE, and SDG&E) examined no alternate carbon price scenarios.  These 
utilities therefore had limited ability to assess the exposure of their candidate portfolios to carbon 
regulatory risk.  
 
3.2 Other types of carbon regulations considered  
Future carbon regulations could take various forms other than a federal carbon tax or cap-and-
trade system, such as generator emission performance standards or technology-specific 
requirements (e.g., that all new coal-fired generation come equipped with carbon capture 
capabilities).  Two Western states, California and Washington, have already established emission 
performance standards for electric power generation that effectively prohibit the states’ utilities 
                                                 
11 This judgment is further supported by the fact that the 2007 Bingaman-Warner bill, which effectively supplanted 
the 2006 draft Bingaman proposal analyzed by EIA, has a safety-valve price of $12/metric ton, rather than the 
$7/ton safety-valve price in earlier proposals. 
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from building or signing new long-term contracts with coal-fired power plants lacking CCS, and 
Montana adopted a more limited standard that applies only to new, utility-owned or leased coal-
fired power plants.  Montana, Oregon, and Washington also require that new power plants 
mitigate a portion of their projected carbon emissions. 
 
Utilities in states with existing emission performance standards and/or mitigation requirements 
all accounted for these regulations within their resource plans (provided that the regulations were 
in place at the time that the resource plan was prepared).  In addition, several utilities considered 
expansions to existing state carbon regulations.  Specifically, PacifiCorp considered a scenario in 
which an emission performance standard similar to the one already adopted in California and 
Washington is implemented throughout the utility’s six-state service territory.  PGE, meanwhile, 
assumed that Oregon’s existing carbon emission mitigation standard for new baseload power 
plants would apply to coal-fired baseload generation (not just natural gas-fired generation, as is 
currently the case).   
 
Finally, notwithstanding the fact that a number of utilities considered some state-level carbon 
policies in their analysis, it is interesting to note that no utilities in our sample considered 
emission prices based specifically on existing state greenhouse gas emission reduction goals, 
despite the fact that these may (arguably) be a better indicator of the carbon regulatory regime 
faced by utilities in the near-term than is federal policy.12 
 
4. Consideration of Low-Carbon Resource Options and Portfolios 
A critical aspect of managing carbon regulatory risks is evaluating options for hedging those 
risks.  At present, the primary means by which utilities in the U.S. can hedge carbon regulatory 
risks is by focusing future resource development on low-carbon resources.  Standard practice in 
utility resource planning is to construct multiple candidate resource portfolios, each composed of 
different types and quantities of various resource options, and then estimate the cost of each 
candidate portfolio (often under a range of alternate assumptions about future conditions), in 
order to reach a decision about a single “preferred” resource strategy.  A utility’s ability to fully 
assess the cost and value of mitigating its exposure to carbon regulation risk is therefore 
contingent upon its consideration of a diverse array of low-carbon resources and candidate 
resource portfolios.   
 
To gauge the extent to which utilities in our sample evaluated options for hedging carbon 
regulatory risk, we describe the carbon intensity of the candidate portfolios evaluated by each 
utility, in terms of their composite CO2 emission rates (see Figure 3).  We calculated the 
composite emission rate of each candidate portfolio by averaging the CO2 emission rates of all 
new supply- and demand-side resources in the portfolio, weighted by their expected annual 
energy production (or energy savings in the case of energy efficiency) in the last year of the 
utility’s planning period.  To maintain consistency across utilities, we excluded from this 
calculation any contract renewals projected to occur over the planning period as well as generic 
                                                 
12 Seven Western states have established statewide greenhouse gas emission reduction goals, and most have joined 
with the Canadian provinces of British Columbia and Manitoba to form the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), which 
is working to develop a regional cap-and-trade system and/or other market-based mechanisms to reduce the states’ 
and provinces’ combined emissions to 15% below 2005 levels by 2020 (WCI 2007). 
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short/medium-term market purchases.  The calculated composite emission rates therefore 
specifically reflect the new, physical supply- and demand-side resources in each candidate 
portfolio.  For reference, Figure 3 also shows the CO2 emission rates of combined cycle natural 
gas and sub-critical pulverized coal generation, representing the bookend emission rates for 
conventional fossil-fuel generation technologies. 
 
Almost all of the utilities in our sample constructed at least one candidate portfolio with a 
composite emission rate substantially less than a CCGT (i.e., <400 lbs CO2/MWh), suggesting 
that most utilities did consider a good range of carbon regulation mitigation options.  The only 
exceptions are Nevada Power, Sierra Pacific, and Tri-State, as these utilities evaluated candidate 
portfolios that, in almost all cases, contained significant quantities of conventional pulverized 
coal (without CCS) and, unlike the other utilities in our sample, did not evaluate candidate 
portfolios consisting primarily of energy efficiency, renewables, or other low-carbon options.   
 
In most cases, utilities developed low-carbon candidate portfolios by first specifying aggressive 
energy efficiency savings targets.  Nine of the fifteen utilities (Avista, LADWP, NorthWestern, 
PG&E, PGE, PSE, SCE, SDG&E, and Seattle City Light) included their estimate of the 
“maximum achievable” energy efficiency program savings in all candidate portfolios.  This 
represents the portion of the total economic (cost-effective) potential that could be obtained 
through utility-funded energy efficiency programs in which the utility covers 100% of the 
incremental cost of more-efficient equipment.13  Not surprisingly, these utilities’ candidate 
portfolios generally contained much greater levels of energy efficiency than the other utilities in 
our sample.  Specifically, among the nine utilities whose candidate portfolios included the 
maximum achievable potential, energy efficiency program savings represented as much as 18% 
to 50% of all new energy resources in the portfolio.  In comparison, the maximum contribution 
from energy efficiency in the other six utilities’ candidate portfolios ranged from just 6% to 17% 
of all new energy resources. 
 
Most utilities also evaluated candidate portfolios with a large contribution from new renewable 
electricity.  The only exceptions were Nevada Power, Sierra Pacific, and Tri-State, which 
evaluated candidate portfolios with renewables representing no more than 12% of new supply-
side energy resources.  All other utilities constructed at least one candidate portfolio with 
renewables representing at least 50% of new supply-side energy resources, and three utilities 
(Avista, PacifiCorp, and Seattle City Light) evaluated candidate portfolios in which renewables 
represented 100% of all new supply-side resources.  Wind power was generally identified as the 
renewable resource most-likely to contribute significantly to the resource supply of these 
candidate portfolios, though other renewable sources were also frequently included.  Many of the 
utilities in our sample are subject to state renewables portfolio standards (RPS), which require 
utilities to obtain specific quantities of renewable energy, thereby setting a floor on the amount 
of renewables considered in resource plans.  Nonetheless, almost all of these utilities (the 
exceptions being Nevada Power and Sierra Pacific) evaluated candidate portfolios containing 
greater levels of renewables than strictly required for RPS compliance. 
                                                 
13 Maximum achievable potential is less than the full cost-effective potential due to factors including, but not limited 
to: (a) stock turnover rates, (b) non-economic barriers to energy efficiency adoption, and (c) naturally-occurring 
improvements in energy efficiency.  For further discussion of the concept of maximum achievable potential as used 
in energy efficiency potential studies, see Rufo and Coito (2002) and National Action Plan (2007). 
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Interestingly, compared to energy efficiency and renewable energy, other types of low-carbon 
resources played a relatively limited role in utilities’ construction of low-carbon candidate 
portfolios.  Despite increased attention to CCS and nuclear generation in mitigating carbon 
emissions, Western utilities do not expect to rely on these sources to any significant extent in the 
period covered by their resource plans. Only two utilities (Idaho Power and PSCo) evaluated 
candidate portfolios with new nuclear generation, for example, signaling continuing concern 
about the cost and/or public acceptance of constructing new nuclear power plants.  Six utilities 
(Idaho Power, NorthWestern, PacifiCorp, PGE, PSCo, and PSE) evaluated candidate portfolios 
containing IGCC with CCS, with maximum portfolio contributions ranging from approximately 
10% to 75% of all supply-side energy resources in the portfolio but, as shown later, these 
resources were rarely selected for the preferred portfolio.  To summarize, energy efficiency and 
renewable energy are the dominant low-carbon strategies currently being considered by utilities 
in the Western U.S., although some utilities are beginning to evaluate nuclear and CCS as low-
carbon resource options.  
 
5. Accounting for Indirect Impacts of Carbon Regulations in Resource Planning 
Within the context of utility resource planning, the most direct effect of future carbon regulations 
is to increase the projected operating cost of carbon-emitting resources in the utility’s candidate 
portfolios.  However, there are a number of potential indirect impacts of carbon regulations that 
are somewhat less recognized, which may also be important for utilities to incorporate into their 
resource planning analysis.   
 
Table 2 lists some of these potential indirect energy market impacts, and identifies whether or 
not utilities in our sample included these impacts in their portfolio analyses.  The results suggest 
that utility resource planners are only beginning to acknowledge and evaluate many of these 
potentially significant effects, and that substantial work may be needed to assess how best to 
incorporate these effects into energy planning and investment decisions.      
 
5.1 Electricity market prices 
Analyses of carbon policy proposals typically project that carbon regulations would lead to an 
increase in wholesale electricity market prices.  Capturing this effect is critical to utility resource 
planning for at least two reasons.  First, different candidate portfolios generally entail different 
levels of exposure to wholesale market prices; ignoring the impact of carbon regulations on 
regional electricity market prices could therefore create a bias toward portfolios with a heavier 
reliance on market purchases.  Second, wholesale electricity market prices are often a key input 
to deriving the avoided costs from energy efficiency investments.  Accounting for the effect of 
carbon regulations on wholesale electricity prices is therefore critical to properly valuing energy 
efficiency cost-effectiveness and market potential in carbon-regulation scenarios. 
 
Carbon regulations could impact regional electricity market prices through a variety of 
mechanisms, the most immediate being to add an emission cost to the marginal cost of 
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generators throughout the region, thereby raising market prices.14  A utility’s ability to account 
for this particular effect depends on how it develops its electricity price forecast.  Several utilities 
in our study used regional production cost models to develop unique electricity market price 
forecasts for each scenario, with the particular carbon price projection for that scenario input into 
the simulation model.  Other utilities developed their electricity price forecasts from projections 
of marginal heat rates for nearby trading hubs, which they translated into electricity price 
projections based on fuel price and carbon price forecasts.  This approach is somewhat cruder 
than the production cost model approach, as it does not allow the utility to account for potential 
changes in regional dispatch order as a result of differences in the marginal emission rate of 
generation resources in the region.  This impact could be particularly critical at carbon prices 
high enough to raise the operating cost of pulverized coal-fired generation to above that of a 
CCGT.  
 
5.2 Natural gas commodity prices 
Natural gas demand and, correspondingly, natural gas commodity prices may increase or 
decrease under carbon regulations, depending on the cost and availability of other low-carbon 
alternatives to coal-fired generation.15  A change in natural gas prices induced by carbon 
regulations is relevant to utility resource planning by (1) increasing/decreasing the expected cost 
of natural gas-fired generation included in the utility’s candidate portfolios, and (2) 
increasing/decreasing electricity market prices throughout the region to the extent that gas-fired 
generation is the marginal generation resource.  These impacts could conceivably be of the same 
order of magnitude as the direct emission costs associated with carbon regulations.16 
 
Every utility in our sample evaluated candidate portfolio costs under multiple gas price forecasts; 
however, only four utilities explicitly linked gas prices and carbon prices for the purposes of 
developing electricity market price projections and modeling the cost of candidate portfolios.  
Three of these utilities (PSCo, PSE, and Seattle City Light) simply used their “high gas price” 
forecasts in their “high carbon price” scenario, although their high gas price projections were not 
developed based on any specific assumptions about future carbon emission prices.  PacifiCorp, 
in contrast, commissioned an outside consultant to develop separate natural gas price forecasts 
specific to each of its carbon tax and cap-and-trade scenarios.  None of the other utilities made 
any systematic link between their carbon price and natural gas price assumptions. 
 
                                                 
14 Carbon regulations may also impact electricity prices (over the longer term) due to effects on fuel prices, load 
growth, generation retirements and additions, and transmission expansion.  We discuss some of these impacts below. 
15 For example, under the 2007 McCain-Lieberman proposal, EIA projects that wellhead natural gas prices in 2030 
would be between 5% lower and 18% higher than in the reference case, depending on assumptions about the 
availability of new nuclear generation, CCS, liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports, and biomass (EIA 2007b, 2007c).   
16 For example, a $1.00/MMBtu increase in the delivered price of natural gas to electric generation (about 13% of 
the current price) would raise the fuel cost of a CCGT by about $7/MWh, which is comparable to the direct carbon 
emission cost of a CCGT with a $20/ton carbon tax. 
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5.3 Load growth 
An increase in retail electricity prices associated with carbon regulations may slow load growth 
(distinct from the effects of energy efficiency programs).17  This dynamic is relevant to utility 
resource planning, first and foremost, by reducing the utility’s own resource needs.  Although 
virtually all of the utilities in our sample developed low load growth projections, only two 
utilities (PSE and PSCo) explicitly linked high carbon prices to low load growth within their 
analysis.  Also relevant to utility resource planning is any effect that carbon regulations would 
have on load growth throughout the region, given the potential impacts of this growth on 
electricity market prices.  Three utilities (Avista, PSE, and Seattle City Light) accounted for this 
potential dynamic, by assuming reduced load growth throughout the region within their 
simulation models used to develop electricity price projections for carbon regulation scenarios.   
 
5.4 Accelerated coal plant retirements 
Carbon regulations could affect the timing of generation retirements in a number of ways, the 
most significant of which may be to accelerate the retirement of existing coal plants.18  Such a 
dynamic has two-fold significance for utility resource planning.  First, early retirement of a 
utility’s own coal-fired generation will increase the size of its future resource deficit, and 
therefore increase its incremental resource need.  Eleven of the fifteen utilities in our sample own 
or have long-term contracts with coal-fired generation.  However, only two utilities, PGE and 
PSCo, conducted analyses within their resource plan to explicitly examine whether carbon 
regulations would justify the early retirement of their own coal-fired generation.   
 
Second, coal-plant retirements at a regional level could affect electricity market prices, as a result 
of associated changes in generation dispatch order and, over the longer-term, new generation 
investment.  A utility’s ability to account for the effect of regional coal-plant retirements on 
electricity market prices depends, in part, on how the utility develops its electricity price 
forecasts.  Four of the utilities in our sample (Avista, PacifiCorp, PGE, and PSE) use regional 
capacity expansion models linked to production cost models to project electricity market prices.  
In principle, this type of modeling could be used to simulate the effect of carbon regulations on 
regional generation retirements, and the corresponding impact on electricity market prices.  
However, most of these utilities’ resource plans to do not provide sufficient information to 
determine whether their modeling accounted for this potential dynamic.  The only exception is 
PGE, which specifically indicated that the electricity market simulation did not allow generation 
retirements prior to the end of each plant’s original book life. 
 
                                                 
17 For example, EIA projects that, compared to the respective reference cases, load growth in the Western U.S. 
would be 30% lower under S.139, 26% lower under S.280, and 5% lower under the 2006 Bingaman proposal (EIA 
2003, 2007a, and 2007b).  Note, though, that these projections capture the combined effects of customer price 
elasticity and increased energy efficiency program activity.  Also, carbon regulations could lead to increased use of 
plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, and to electrification of heating and cooling, both of which would tend to increase 
load growth. 
18 Estimates of the size of this effect vary significantly.  For example, EIA’s analysis of the original McCain-
Lieberman climate legislation projects that almost 25% of all coal-fired generation in the West would be retired by 
2025, compared to essentially none in the reference case (EIA 2003).  In contrast, EIA’s analysis of the 2007 
McCain-Lieberman bill projects that only 4% of coal capacity in the West would be retired by 2030, and its analysis 
of the 2006 Bingaman proposal projects no such retirements (EIA 2007a, 2007b). 
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5.5 Other indirect impacts 
In addition to the particular effects discussed above, carbon regulations could have a multitude of 
other indirect impacts on regional energy markets that may be important for energy planners to 
consider, including:   
 
• Allowance prices for other capped air pollutants, resulting from a reduction in traditional 
coal-fired power generation and correspondingly reduced demand and prices for criteria air 
pollutant (e.g., SO2) emission allowances; 
• Regional generation expansion, as utilities shift their capacity expansion efforts towards 
low-carbon generation, which could, in turn, affect electricity market prices; 
• Regional transmission expansion, as utilities construct new transmission into regions rich 
in low-carbon resources, which could enable broader access to these resources by other 
utilities; 
• Availability of federal incentives, if legislators viewed existing financial incentives for low-
carbon resources as duplicative, possibly resulting in an accelerated reduction or 
discontinuation of those incentives; 
• Capital costs and technology development associated with rapidly increasing demand for 
commercially-available low-carbon resources (e.g., wind) and/or accelerated “learning 
curve” effects for emerging low-carbon resources (e.g., concentrating solar or CCS). 
 
 
6. Incorporating Carbon Cost Uncertainty into Portfolio Selection  
6.1 Portfolio selection under uncertainty 
Utility resource plans typically culminate by identifying a single, preferred portfolio.  The 
process of selecting a preferred portfolio invariably involves a comparison of candidate 
portfolios’ expected costs under base-case assumptions.  Many utilities also select their preferred 
portfolio based upon some comparison of the uncertainty in costs of their candidate portfolios.  
The overall uncertainty in the cost of a candidate portfolio is the net effect of uncertainties in 
numerous underlying input variables.  Uncertainty in some input variables (e.g., annual rainfall, 
summer peak temperatures, natural gas price volatility) can be defined probabilistically based on 
historical data.  In these cases, utilities’ often use Monte Carlo methods to derive a single 
stochastic risk measure for each candidate portfolio, to express its overall uncertainty in cost 
associated with all probabilistically-defined input parameters.19  Some utilities then employ 
specialized modeling tools to identify the efficient frontier, defined as the set of portfolios with 
the lowest theoretical stochastic risk for a given expected cost (and vice-versa).20   
 
Uncertainty in input variables for which historical data do not exist – such as carbon emission 
prices – is less amenable to probabilistic definition and stochastic modeling.  Cost uncertainty 
associated with these types of variables is therefore often assessed by calculating candidate 
portfolio costs across a discrete number of alternate scenarios (i.e., scenario analysis rather than 
                                                 
19 See Bolinger and Wiser (2005) for a description and discussion of stochastic risk measures used in recent utility 
resource plans. 
20 The efficient frontier concept derives from portfolio theory and was first developed by Markowitz (1952).  
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stochastic Monte Carlo analysis).  When combined with stochastic risk analysis, scenario 
analysis can then yield a family of efficient frontiers as illustrated in Figure 4.   
 
Regardless of whether or not it is combined with stochastic analysis, though, scenario analysis 
simply yields a range of portfolio costs across multiple sets of assumptions and does not produce 
a precisely-defined measure of uncertainty in portfolio cost.  Utilities therefore face a significant 
challenge in incorporating cost uncertainty associated with future carbon regulations into their 
preferred portfolio selection process.  On the one hand, the magnitude of the uncertainty and 
implications for the relative economics of competing candidate portfolios are likely to be quite 
large.  However, there is not yet an established analytic and decision-making framework to 
meaningfully translate information about variation in portfolio costs across multiple carbon price 
scenarios into the selection of a single preferred portfolio.  Furthermore, utilities must ultimately 
make some tradeoff between the twin objectives of minimizing expected portfolio costs and 
minimizing uncertainty in portfolio costs and, thus far at least, relatively little effort has been 
placed on how best to make such tradeoffs (e.g., by assessing the risk preferences of ratepayers).   
 
6.2 Approaches to accounting for carbon cost uncertainty 
Perhaps as a reflection of the challenges described above, many utilities in our study appear to 
have not explicitly incorporated information about variation in portfolio costs across carbon price 
scenarios into their choice of a preferred resource portfolio.  Eleven utilities evaluated candidate 
portfolio costs under multiple carbon price projections, and thus were able to show how 
candidate portfolio costs varied across carbon regulation assumptions.  We reviewed the text of 
these utilities’ resource plans to determine how, if at all, this information was used to inform the 
selection of the preferred portfolio.  Six of these eleven utilities (Nevada Power, PGE, PSCo, 
Seattle City Light, Sierra Pacific, and Tri-State) made no reference to the results of their carbon 
scenario analysis when explaining their rationale for selecting a preferred portfolio; it is unclear 
what, if any, role that scenario analysis may have had in their portfolio selection processes.21   
 
The other five utilities that evaluated portfolio costs under multiple carbon price projections did 
rely, to some degree, on the results from that uncertainty analysis when selecting a preferred 
portfolio.  Although their methods differed substantially, we generalize from their approaches to 
identify three types of strategies that resource planners could consider for incorporating 
information about carbon cost uncertainty into their portfolio selection process (recognizing that 
other approaches may also be available): 
 
Integrated risk metrics.  Avista included carbon emission prices as a random variable in its 
stochastic analysis, by stipulating probabilities for a set of alternate carbon price projections and 
allowing its model to select a different price projection in each iteration of the Monte Carlo 
analysis.  Each candidate portfolio’s exposure to uncertainty in carbon costs was therefore 
captured in its overall stochastic risk metric (in Avista’s case, the portfolio’s standard deviation 
in total operating costs).  Idaho Power and NorthWestern also assigned probabilities to each of 
their carbon price projections.  Idaho Power used these probabilities to develop a “risk adder” for 
each candidate portfolio, while NorthWestern used the probabilities to compute a risk-adjusted 
                                                 
21 In part, this is symptomatic of the more general tendency of utility resource plans to provide only cursory and 
vague explanations of the rationale for choosing a particular preferred portfolio. 
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cost for its candidate portfolios.  The risk metric approaches used by these three utilities have 
some advantages by creating a common numerical measure by which all portfolios can be 
compared, and by allowing uncertainty in carbon regulatory costs to be integrated with other 
uncertainties into a single metric, rather than addressing individual risks in a piecemeal fashion.  
However, these types of approaches are not without limitations.  One potential pitfall is that they 
may lead to a false sense of precision in the resulting risk metric, given the subjective and highly 
uncertain underlying assumptions about the probability of each carbon price projection.  
Depending on the structure of the analysis, it may then be difficult for stakeholders to determine 
how altering these critical assumptions would affect the results.   
 
Threshold analysis.  PSE identified the threshold probability of its high carbon price scenario 
occurring such that its two finalist candidate portfolios would have the same expected cost, and 
then chose its preferred portfolio based on its judgment of whether the actual probability of a 
high carbon price scenario was higher or lower than that threshold value.  As a more limited 
example, PacifiCorp conducted a stand-alone “break-even” analysis, separate from its overall 
portfolio analysis, to identify the carbon price at which its capacity expansion model would 
choose a CCGT rather than a coal-plant.  An advantage of these types of threshold analyses is 
that they place the subjective judgment at the center of the decision-making process, rather than 
burying those assumptions deep in the analysis.  That said, simply identifying the threshold says 
nothing about the magnitude of the potential upside and downside risks of each portfolio.   
 
Robustness testing.  PacifiCorp used a capacity expansion model to identify the least-cost 
portfolios under a range of carbon price scenarios, and found that the capacity expansion model 
always selected particular types of resources.  PacifiCorp therefore concluded that these 
resources were resilient to carbon cost uncertainty and included them in subsequent capacity 
expansion model runs conducted to select the remaining resources for its preferred portfolio.  
Though not identical, this approach bears certain similarities to “robust methods” used in other 
policy arenas when conditions of deep uncertainty exist, which seek to identify strategies that 
minimize regret across the range of uncertainties and that maintain the ability to adapt to 
changing circumstances (see Lempert et al., 2006). 
 
One overarching issue remains regardless of the approach used to account for uncertainty in 
carbon regulation costs.  Ultimately, some tradeoff is likely to be required between minimizing 
expected cost and minimizing risks (e.g., uncertainty in cost).  However, most utilities did not 
identify the criteria used to make this tradeoff, and those that did identify specific criteria (e.g., 
by assigning numerical weights to expected portfolio cost and portfolio risk), provided little or 
no explanation of the underlying rationale for the criteria used.  As suggested by Bolinger and 
Wiser (2005), to the extent that ratepayers bear the risks associated with future carbon emission 
costs, the tradeoff between expected portfolio cost and portfolio risk would ideally be based on 
the risk preferences of ratepayers.  More research is necessary, however, to identify these 
preferences.    
 
7. The Carbon Intensity of Utilities’ Preferred Resource Portfolios  
Though generally not a binding, long-term commitment, the preferred resource portfolios 
identified in utility resource plans nevertheless provide perhaps the best public indication of their 
current long-term resource strategies.  In this section, we summarize the preferred resource 
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portfolios selected by the fifteen utilities in our sample in order to highlight general trends and 
differences in the strategic direction of Western utilities, and the implications for these utilities’ 
exposure to carbon regulatory risk.  As shown here, despite the fact that federal global climate 
regulation does not yet exist in the U.S., the prospect of such regulation – along with an array of 
existing state policies directed at mitigating climate change and supporting energy efficiency and 
renewables – does appear to be affecting utilities’ resource choices. 
 
Figure 5 summarizes the composition and carbon intensity of each utility’s preferred portfolio, 
based on expected energy generation/savings in the last year of the utility’s portfolio 
construction period (listed in Table 1).  We exclude from the figure existing generation and new 
generation already under development/under contract at the time of the resource plan, future 
contract renewals, and future short/medium-term market purchases.  Figure 5 instead focuses 
specifically on new, physical supply- and demand-side resources in each utility’s preferred 
portfolio, and shows the carbon intensity of each utility’s preferred portfolio in terms of its 
composite emission rate (as defined in Section 4).  We present both the “Gross Emission Rate”, 
which reflects the new resources, and the “Net Emission Rate”, which also accounts for reduced 
emissions from planned generation retirements. 
 
A number of high-level findings emerge from this summary: 
 
Energy efficiency and renewable generation are the dominant low-carbon resources in 
utilities’ preferred portfolios.  All fifteen utilities selected a preferred portfolio that included 
expanded utility-funded energy efficiency programs and new renewable generation. In fact, half 
of the utilities in our sample selected portfolios in which energy efficiency and renewable energy 
together constitute 50% or more of new energy resources in the portfolio.  Only three utilities 
(Sierra Pacific, Nevada Power, and Tri-State) selected preferred portfolios in which either energy 
efficiency or renewables constitute less than 10% of all new resources.  Also of note is that all 
utilities with an RPS, except for LADWP, Nevada Power, NorthWestern, and Sierra Pacific, 
included more renewables in their preferred portfolios than strictly required for RPS compliance.   
 
Other types of low-carbon resources – most notably, nuclear power and CCS – play a limited 
role in utilities’ preferred portfolios.  Despite stated interest, few utilities have found that 
nuclear or CCS are ready for prime time during their upcoming planning period.  The two 
utilities that evaluated candidate portfolios with new nuclear power, Idaho Power and PSCo, 
both included it in their preferred portfolios, although new nuclear power appears in PSCo’s 
preferred portfolio only after the period characterized in the figure (2008-2020).22  Of the six 
utilities that included IGCC with CCS in their candidate portfolios, PSCo is also the only utility 
to include this resource in its preferred portfolio.  Finally, three utilities (Idaho Power, 
PacifiCorp, and PG&E) selected preferred portfolios with relatively small amounts of new 
combined heat and power (CHP) generation. 
 
Natural gas is a common, although not universal, element in utilities’ preferred portfolios, 
while utilities in inland states are continuing to pursue new coal without CCS.  After energy 
                                                 
22 PSCo constructed the supply-side of its candidate portfolios out through 2046, but identified demand-side targets 
only through 2020; thus, in describing its preferred resource portfolio, we focus on the period ending in 2020.  
Nuclear resources are added to the preferred portfolio beginning in 2022. 
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efficiency and renewable energy, natural gas-fired generation represents the next most-common 
resource within the utilities’ preferred portfolios.  Twelve utilities’ preferred portfolios include 
gas-fired generation, in most cases constituting at least 20% of the total portfolio and, for several 
utilities, upwards of 60%.  Meanwhile, five of the eight utilities serving inland states in the 
Western U.S. selected preferred portfolios containing new pulverized coal generation without 
CCS.  Of these five, Tri-State’s portfolio is the most heavily-reliant on new coal, representing 
93% of new supply- and demand-side energy resources.  The four other utilities selected 
preferred portfolios in which new pulverized coal constitutes between 20% and 40% of the new 
resources.  None of the seven utilities with service territories in California, Oregon, or 
Washington selected portfolios containing new coal without CCS, reflecting the fact that utilities 
in California and Washington are subject to carbon emission performance standards that 
effectively preclude the utilities from constructing or signing new contracts for coal-fired 
generation without CCS. 
 
Retirement of existing coal-fired generation remains limited.  Although not shown explicitly in 
Figure 5, three utilities (Nevada Power, PSCo, and Sierra Pacific) plan to retire existing coal-
fired generation (each no more 300 MW nameplate capacity) over their respective planning 
periods.  PSCo explicitly evaluated the economics of retiring a coal plant, by constructing several 
candidate portfolios in which the coal plant was replaced with a new CCGT, rather than 
refurbishing it to extend its life.  The deciding factor in the utility’s decision to retire the plant 
was the potential carbon emission costs.  Nevada Power and Sierra Pacific, in contrast, simply 
assumed throughout their planning analyses that plants would be retired at the end of their 
nominal economic lives, without explicit consideration of carbon constraints. 
 
The carbon intensity of utilities’ preferred portfolios varies widely.  The gross emission rates of 
the fifteen utilities’ preferred portfolios (again, based on only new supply- and demand-side 
resources in each portfolio) ranges from zero lbs/MWh to more than 1,600 lbs/MWh.  Whether 
or not a particular utility’s preferred portfolio falls in the lower half or the upper half is a 
function of whether or not it includes new unsequestered coal.  The ten preferred portfolios 
containing no new coal without CCS all have composite emission rates less than 500 lbs/MWh, 
varying largely according to the amount of new natural gas-fired generation included. Utilities 
with resource portfolios that include new, unsequestered coal plants have emission rates ranging 
from approximately 700-1,600 lbs/MWh, depending on the contribution from coal.   
 
Aggregating the fifteen utilities’ preferred portfolios provides a picture, albeit partial and 
provisional, of electric resource development in the Western U.S. over the next ten to twenty 
years.  Overall, natural gas-fired generation is the largest component of the incremental energy 
resources in utilities’ preferred portfolios, representing 33% of the new, physical energy 
resources (see Figure 6).  Renewables (26%), energy efficiency (22%), and pulverized coal 
without CCS (14%) make up the lion’s share of the remaining new resources, with small 
contributions from CHP (2%), nuclear (1%), IGCC with CCS (1%), and IGCC without CCS 
(1%).  Overall, we see a picture of growing interest in renewable energy and energy efficiency, 
in part due to projected carbon regulations, but little corresponding increase in planned additions 
of nuclear and CCS. 
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8. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Future carbon regulations could require a dramatic shift in electric infrastructure development 
away from conventional fossil generation technologies, and an unprecedented scale-up of 
investment in low-carbon resources.  Long-term resource planning can serve an instrumental role 
in facilitating this possible shift, by providing a framework for analyzing the potential cost and 
risks associated with future carbon regulations and by assessing options for mitigating that risk.  
For utility resource planning to serve this role effectively, however, requires confidence that the 
specific assumptions and methods used to analyze carbon regulatory risk are sound and will 
support prudent investment decisions.   
 
Our review of recent Western utility resource plans has shown that utilities are making important 
strides in accounting for the financial risks associated with future carbon regulations.  At the 
same time, their assumptions and methods vary considerably, and reveal opportunities for 
improvement.  Energy regulators have a particularly important role in ensuring that carbon risk is 
appropriately addressed, given their responsibility to ensure prudent investment decisions by 
regulated utilities, and given that much of the costs of future carbon regulations will ultimately 
be born by ratepayers.  State regulators and policy-makers should therefore consider providing 
policy guidance to utilities on appropriate assumptions and methods to be used in assessing and 
managing these risks in their long-term resource plans. 
 
Though our review has focused on a subset of U.S. electric utilities, this work holds implications 
for all utilities and energy policymakers that are seeking to minimize the costs associated with 
future carbon regulations.  Even in areas where carbon regulations already exist, the possibility 
of strengthened future policies must be considered in planning decisions.  Based on our review of 
planning efforts in the U.S., we offer the following recommendations:   
 
• Include a projection of carbon costs in the base-case that reflects an estimate of the most-
likely carbon regulations over the planning period. 
• Evaluate candidate portfolios across a broad range of alternate carbon cost scenarios. 
• Analyze a broad range of low-carbon portfolios, with well-developed cost estimates, 
considering all available low-carbon resource options. 
• When evaluating candidate portfolio costs, account for the potentially-significant indirect 
impacts of future carbon regulations, including the effects on wholesale electricity market 
prices, natural gas prices, load growth, and coal-plant retirements. 
• Effectively and clearly balance portfolio cost and risk, when selecting a preferred portfolio. 
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Table 1. Utility Resource Plans Included in This Study 
Utility Service Territory 
Year of 
Resource 
Plan 
Portfolio 
Construction 
Period* 
Avista Idaho, Washington 2007 2008-2027 
Idaho Power Idaho, Oregon 2006 2006-2025 
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP) California 2006 2006-2025 
Nevada Power Nevada 2006 2007-2026 
NorthWestern Montana 2007 2008-2027 
PacifiCorp 
Oregon, Utah, 
Wyoming, Washington, 
Idaho, California 
2007 2007-2016 
Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) California 2006 2007-2016 
Portland General Electric (PGE) Oregon 2007 2008-2012 
Public Service Company of Colorado/Xcel (PSCo) Colorado 2007 2008-2020 
Puget Sound Energy (PSE) Washington 2007 2008-2027 
Southern California Edison (SCE) California 2006 2007-2016 
San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E) California 2006 2007-2016 
Seattle City Light Washington 2006 2007-2026 
Sierra Pacific Nevada, California 2007 2008-2027 
Tri-State Generation and Transmission Colorado, New Mexico, Wyoming, Nebraska 2007 2007-2025 
* The portfolio construction period is the time horizon over which each utility identified all elements of its 
candidate resource portfolios.  
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Table 2. Indirect Carbon Regulation Impacts Accounted for in Resource Planning Analysis 
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Avista ?    ?  ?  ?  
Idaho Power ?              
LADWP                 
Nevada Power    ?            
NorthWestern ?               
PacifiCorp ? ? ?    ?       
PG&E  *                
PGE ?      ?        
PSCo ? ?   ? ?         
PSE ? ?  ?  ?    
SCE  *             
SDG&E  *             
Seattle City Light ? ?  ?  ?    
Sierra Pacific    ?            
Tri-State G&T                  
Note: The absence of a check mark (?) indicates either that the utility did not account for a particular impact or 
that its resource plan  did not provide sufficient detail to determine whether or not it accounted for that impact.  The 
asterisks (*) shown for PG&E, SCE, and SDG&E indicate that these utilities did not account for carbon regulations 
in their electricity price forecast, but they did include their base-case carbon price as an adder when evaluating the 
cost effectiveness of energy efficiency and renewable energy resource acquisitions. 
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Figure 4. Efficient Frontier of Candidate Portfolios for Multiple Carbon Price Scenarios 
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Figure 5. New Resources in Utilities’ Preferred Portfolios 
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 Figure 6. Aggregate Composition of Western Utilities’ Preferred Resource Portfolios 
 
 
